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Despite the emerging literature on resilient infrastructure systems, the number of studies related to developing communities is rather limited. 
The majority of the existing studies focus mainly on resilience of infrastructure networks in developed countries. Infrastructure networks in 
developed countries are less vulnerable to the impacts of catastrophic disasters due to the existence of established design codes and manage-
ment processes and the availability of financial and technological resources. Catastrophic disasters usually have more extensive impacts on 
infrastructure systems in developing countires. The objective of this study is to investigate the resilience of infrastructure in developing 
countries using a case study of water system in Kathmandu Valley in the aftermath of the 2015 Nepalese Earthquake. First, a new systemic 
farmework for assessment of infrastructure resilience was developed. Second, data obtained from various sources including pre-disaster 
condition, post-disaster damage assessments, and interviews with different stakeholders were used in assessment of different components of 
resilience in the water system.The study investigated three dimensions of resilience in Kathmandu Valley’s water system : (1) exposure ; (2) 
sensitivity ; and (3) adaptive capacity. Through a systemic analysis, various resilience characteristics such as coupling, response behaviors, 
and types of interdependencies that affect the resilience of the system were identified. The findings of the study highlight different factors 
that influenced the resilience of the water system in Kathmandu Valley. These results provide new insights regarding infrastructure resilience 
in the context of developing countries. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The field of infrastructure resilience is an emerging 
area in science and engineering. Several studies (e.g., 
Rinaldi et al. 2001; O’Rourke 2007) have studied the 
determinants of resilience in infrastructure systems. 
The majority of the exiting studies in this area are re-
lated to infrastructure systems in developed countries. 
The extent and nature of resilience in Infrastructure 
systems in developed countries are different from the 
ones in developing counties due to the existence of es-
tablished design codes and management processes, 
differences in social, economic, and political contexts, 
as well as the availability of financial and technologi-
cal resources. There is a critical gap in the body of 
knowledge related to understanding the characteristics 
of resilient lifeline systems in developing countries. In 
addition, among different infrastructure sectors, water 
supply infrastructure plays a vital role in the resilience 
of communities in the face of natural disasters.  A bet-
ter understanding of the determinants of resilience in 
water supply infrastructure is essential in prioritizing 
the allocation of limited resources in developing coun-
tries to reduce the adverse impacts of natural disasters 
on communities. However, the existing studies related 
to the resilience of water systems in developing coun-
tries are rather limited. To this end, the objective of the 
study presented in this paper was to investigate the 
factors influencing the resilience of water systems in 
developing countries using a case study of the 2015 
earthquake in Nepal. 
2 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
Lifeline Infrastructure systems are recognized as key 
elements in investigating the resilience of communi-
ties in the context of disasters (Cutter et al., 2003). The 
National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) de-
fined infrastructure resilience as “the ability to reduce 
the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events.  
The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enter-
prise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, 
adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially dis-
ruptive event” (NIAC, 2009).  
In one stream of research, researchers have concep-
tualized resilience using four properties (known as 
4Rs of resilience): robustness, redundancy, resource-
fulness, and rapidity (Bruneau et al. 2003). In another 
stream of research, different studies have investigated 
the concepts involved in understanding system resili-
ence. According to Gallopin (2006), the resilience of 
a system depends on: (1) the exposure of the system to 
hazard-related perturbations, (2) configuration of the 
system prior to a perturbation, (3) the transformation 
(a.k.a. sensitivity) of the system due to the perturba-
tion, and (4) the adaptive capacity of the parts. The 
frameworks proposed in each of these streams of re-
search are useful for investigation of resilience at dif-
ferent levels. For example, the 4Rs framework is ap-
propriate for evaluation of resilience at facility or 
organizational level. On the other hand, the framework 
proposed by Gallopin (2006) is suitable for a system 
level analysis in which resilience is evaluated through 
the use of the concepts of exposure, sensitivity, and 
adaptive capacity. Hence, in this study, a framework 
for systemic assessment of infrastructure resilience 
was created to analyze the water supply system in 
Kathmandu Valley in 2015 Nepalese Earthquake. As 
shown in Figure1, the framework includes three di-
mensions of analysis (i.e., exposure, sensitivity, and 
adaptive capacity) consistent with the resilience model 
proposed by Gallopin (2006). Exposure is defined as 
the extent to which a system is subjected to perturba-
tions induced by hazards. The exposure of a system 
can be understood based on the nature of hazards and 
value of economic and social resources at risk. Sensi-
tivity of infrastructure systems is dependent on system 
condition (Mostafavi and Abraham 2012); dependen-
cies with other infrastructure (Rinaldi et al. 2001), hu-
man-infrastructure coupling, and the preparedness of 
organizations managing and operating these systems. 
The third dimension of the framework investigates a 
system’s adaptive capacity. The adaptive capacity of 
infrastructure systems depends on the social systems 
managing, operating, and utilizing the physical net-
works. Hence, infrastructure systems’ adaptive capac-
ity can be understood based on the analysis of the ca-
pacity of organizations to respond to hazard-induced 
perturbations as well as public’s capacity to respond 
to service disruptions.  
 
Figure 1. Framework for systemic assessment of resilience in in-
frastructure systems. 
 
3 CASE STUDY 
On April 25, 2015, Nepal witnessed one of the most 
destructive earthquakes in its history. This disaster 
claimed almost 8,500 lives, 22,000 people were in-
jured, more than 800,000 houses were damaged or 
fully destroyed, and about 3 million inhabitants relo-
cated. The earthquake affected 33 out of 75 districts in 
Nepal and various infrastructure sectors. 
Among different sectors, water supply systems ranks 
second (after transportation systems) in terms of the 
value of damages caused by the earthquake. The ex-
tent of damages varies in different locations. Kath-
mandu Valley is among the districts that were severely 
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impacted the earthquake. Kathmandu Valley is the 
most developed and fastest growing place in Nepal 
with population of 2.5 million. While other parts of 
Nepal are mainly rural and lack centralized water sys-
tems, Kathmandu Valley is an urbanized setting with 
an old water supply system. Hence, this study focused 
on the water supply system in Kathmandu Valley in 
order to investigate its resilience.    
Data required for analysis of water system resili-
ence in this study was obtained from four sources: (1) 
reports related to water system characteristics in Kath-
mandu Valley, (2) the post disaster need assessment 
(PDNA) report published by the government of Nepal 
in collaboration with international agencies such as the 
Asian Development Bank and Japan International Co-
operative Agency (JICA), (3) the report published by 
the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI) 
Reconnaissance Team, and (4) field visits and inter-
views with different stakehodlers. The primary 
method for collecting these data was in-depth inter-
views with elected (e.g., mayors, commissioners, and 
members of infrastructure agencies) and appointed 
public officials (e.g., public works managers and ur-
ban planners) at local and national levels, who were 
directly involved in water system operation, manage-
ment, restoration, and response. The interviews were 
recorded (with permission of the interviewees) and 
transcribed in both Nepalese and English. The tran-
scribed interviews were coded along with the second-
ary sources of information (e.g., PDNA and EERI re-
ports) using NVIVO 11 software. The codes were 
refined through pattern analysis to summarize groups 
of codes into constructs, which will be explained in the 
following sections. 
3.1 Exposure of Water System 
Hazards: Kathmandu Valley is located in a seismic 
zone. Prior to the 2015 earthquake, the 1934 AD Bi-
har-Nepal Earthquake produced strong shaking in 
Kathmandu Valley. The seismic record of the region 
suggests that catastrophic earthquakes are expected 
approximately every 75 years (Dixit et al. 2000). In 
fact, the earthquake occurred in April 2015 had an ep-
icenter in the east part of the district of Lamjung and 
was not the expected seismic activity in Kathmandu 
Valley. If the epicenter was closer to the valley, the 
earthquake would have more severe damages. 
 
Value at risk: Another factor affecting the exposure 
of Kathmandu Valley is its population growth, uncon-
trolled development, and poverty (Dixit et al. 2000). 
Nepal is urbanizing rapidly, and Kathmandu Valley as 
a major urban setting in the country has a population 
growth of approximately 7%. Population growth in-
creases the demand for water supply and requires in-
creased development of water supply system in Kath-
mandu valley. With increased development in water 
supply systems, there was more value of water utilities 
and facilities at risk. In addition, the population 
growth increased the adversity of the impacts due to 
water supply disruption on the people living in the re-
gion. Also, uncontrolled development led to improper 
connection of water mainlines to houses which caused 
damages and service disconnections due to the earth-
quake. 
3.2 Sensitivity of Water System 
System condition: Kathmandu Upatyaka Khanepani 
Limited (KUKL) operates and maintains the water 
supply and sewerage systems in most of Kathmandu 
Valley. Water services are provided by KUKL 
through six branch offices inside Kathmandu and four 
municipalities in Lalitpur and Bhaktapur. Kathmandu 
Valley’s water supply system was built approximately 
120 years ago. There are 2.7 million people and 
200,000 connections in its service area. Fig. 2 depicts 
components of water system in Kathmandu Valley. 
The system is composed of eight subsystems, each 
with a different source and treatment plant (EERI 
2015). There are about 45 water reservoirs supplying 
water to the valley. The water system source also in-
cludes 70 tube wells in the North part of the valley that 
provide about 30% of water in the region. The system 
was in a poor condition due to lack of periodic mainte-
nance and rehabilitation causing water leakage in the 
system. The reason for the poor system condition can 
be attributed in part to insufficient management of op-
eration and maintenance due to lack of technicians, 
lack of accurate information about registered users, 
and lack of maintenance funding (EERI 2015).  
KUKL faces two major challenges in supplying water 
to the valley: a huge gap between supply and demand 
and ground water depletion. Due to the existing supply 
and demand gap, not all households have private con-
nections and many use wells and taps in the commu-
nity. In addition KUKL provides water through tank-
ers to areas that do not have service connection. For 
households with private connection, the supply of wa-
ter is limited to few hours during every week requiring 
the households to store water in their houses. To this 
end, the use of in-house water tanks is ubiquitous in 
the valley. In addition, due to the uncertainty in the 
water supply, households dig wells in their property 
for water access. The increased use of ground water 
has led to decline of water tables causing challenges to 
KUKL for management of ground water. An immedi-
ate consequence of ground water depletion is that the 
connected wells and pumps will no longer be able to 
provide water. 
In Kathmandu Valley, various modes of failure 
happened. Due to the 2015 earthquake. One of the 
eight water subsystems (in the South part) experienced 
damage due to a landslide in the Arniko Highway. The 
sub-system in the North part of the valley was dis-
rupted due to power outage causing disruptions to the 
pumps extracting water from ground wells. The power 
outage lasted for two days during which the water sup-
ply was completely disrupted in Gonbagu area. An-
other major damage to the water system was house 
connection breaks. Due to loose connections, the seis-
mic force led to connection breaks at the end point of 
the supply system causing increased water leakage. 
There were no damages reported for the storage tanks 
used for supplying water through water tankers. In 
fact, the storage tanks had full storage when the earth-
quake occurred. Thus, KUKL were able to mobilize 
tankers to supply water to different affected regions.  
KUKL was able to restore the water supply system 
in 21 days after the earthquake. Despite the infor-
mation presented above regarding water system dis-
ruptions, the complete extent of damages and service 
disruptions were not completely understood at the 
time of data collection for this study (five months after 
the earthquake). The reason for the lack of accurate 
information regarding the damages and service disrup-
tions in the water system of Kathmandu Valley was 
the lack of service disruption reported by the custom-
ers due to: (1) damages to buildings; and (2) incon-
sistent quality of service prior to the earthquake.  
System dependencies: The types of dependencies 
identified between water system and other infrastruc-
ture were geographic or physical. According to 
Rinaldi et al. (2001), physical dependencies exist 
when state of one infrastructure is dependent on the 
output of the other infrastructure. In the water supply 
system in Kathmandu Valley, two physical dependen-
cies caused service disruptions. First, in the north part 
of the valley, failures in the power supply system 
caused the pump stations to stop working, and hence, 
Figure 2. Water system of Kathmandu Valley 
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water supply from ground water sources was dis-
rupted. The power supply system was restored after 
two days, and hence, water supply was also restored. 
The water supply system in other areas (such as Chit-
wan plant) also uses ground water sources. Fortu-
nately, however, the power supply systems in those ar-
eas were not disrupted. The second physical 
dependency was between water supply and roads. This 
is a unique type of physical dependency that usually 
does not exist in infratsructure systems in developed 
countries. This dependency was unique to Kathmandu 
Valley since a considerable portion of water supply 
was delivered through water trucks. KUKL developed 
capacities over time to supply water by trucks in re-
sponse to the supply and demand gap in the system. 
KUKL has six tanker stations for filling the water 
trucks, and fortunately, none of these stations were 
damaged by the earthquake. Also, the tankers had full 
storage capacity when the earthquake occurred. 
Hence, KUKL was able to deploy its truck fleets im-
mediately after the earthquake; however, the closure 
of roads due to landslides or blockage due to building 
collapses caused difficulties for the water trucks to ac-
cess certain areas. 
The second type of dependencies identified in 
Kathmandu Valley’s water supply system is geo-
graphic dependencies. Geographic dependencies exist 
when a local hazard can create state changes in differ-
ent infrastructure (Rinaldi et al. 2001). In Kathmandu 
Valley, the majority of water utility lines delivering 
water from the source to plants or storage tanks were 
constructed along the major roads. Hence, landslides 
in roads caused breaks in the water trunks passing 
through the roads. One major incident in the aftermath 
of 2015 earthquake was the breakage of a 35 cm water 
trunk line due to a land slide along the Arniko highway 
causing service disruptions in Patan area. This inci-
dent caused one of the eight sub-systems of KUKL to 
be disrupted for more than two weeks.  
Human-infrastructure coupling is the extent to 
which the public is reliant on the services provided by 
a system. The supply-demand gap in the water system 
of Kathmandu Valley had reduced the public’s reli-
ance on the system for their water supply and storage. 
The use of on-site wells and purchase of water from 
private water trucks as well as on-site storage of water 
were the substitute solutions that the public had 
adopted to cope with the discontinuity of service in the 
water system. These substitutions, to some extent, re-
duced the human-infrastructure coupling, and hence, 
reduced the sensitivity of water system to the impacts 
of the earthquake. If the system had been able to sup-
ply 100% of the demand consistently, the impacts of 
the earthquake on the system and public would have 
been more deleterious. 
Preparedness of organization: In the case of water 
supply system in Kathmandu Valley, KUKL did not 
have an established disaster management processes in 
place at the time of the earthquake in 2015.  As men-
tioned earlier, the supply-demand disparity in the wa-
ter system of Kathmandu Valley had created a chronic 
stress on the agency. Meeting the day-to-day water 
needs of the customers along with limitations in the 
agency’s resources had reduced the capability of the 
agency to establish disaster management processes. 
Despite the lack of disaster management process, 
KUKL was able to respond to the service disruptions 
caused by the earthquake with the help of WASH 
Cluster. First, the agency prioritized the customers 
based on their urgency for receiving water supply. For 
example, hospitals and public buildings were priori-
tized for immediate service restoration. Another prior-
ity for KUKL was to provide water to government-es-
tablished shelter camps. 
The second component of KUKL’s response activ-
ities included damage assessment. In the aftermath of 
the earthquake, KUKL did not know the extent of 
damages because a large portion of population had left 
Kathmandu Valley and many buildings were dam-
aged. The KUKL’s response was to deploy its person-
nel to facilities (e.g., treatment plants, storage tanks, 
reservoirs, pipelines, and pump stations) to collect in-
formation about the damages to water system compo-
nent. The KUKL’s capacity to monitor and assess the 
condition of underground utility conditions was very 
limited. Hence, the agency was collecting information 
about damages based on customers’ complaints such 
as service disruptions or water leakage in the streets. 
However, there were many damages and leakages that 
were identified late since KUKL did not receive any 
complaints from the customers. 
3.3 Adaptive Capacity 
Two determinants of social system’s adaptive ca-
pacity in infrastructure include: (1) adaptive capacity 
of administering agency; and (2) the adaptive capacity 
of general public. As mentioned earlier, the water sup-
ply system in Kathmandu Valley suffers from a signif-
icant supply-demand disparity. This supply-demand 
disparity created a chronic stress on the system, 
KUKL, and general public. The chronic stress caused 
both the agency and the public to develop adaptive ca-
pacity through enhancing redundancy. As for the 
agency, KUKL developed water trucking capacity to 
supply water to households during times of load shed-
ding in the network. This additional capacity had not 
been developed for earthquake emergency manage-
ment; as for KUKL, every day was an emergency sit-
uation to supply water to the people.  
As for the general public, the chronic stress caused 
by water supply shortage caused the household to 
adopt in-house storage tanks. Almost every household 
in Kathmandu Valley had a storage tank to store water 
during the scheduled supply time and usage during 
load shedding periods. In addition, though it was ille-
gal, many households had their own shallow wells as 
a backup source. Through these alternative solutions 
developed under chronic stress of water supply short-
age, households built redundancy overtime. Hence, in 
the aftermath of the earthquake, service disruptions in 
KUKL water supply did not cause major problems to 
water access since households already had substitu-
tions. 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
The findings of this study highlights the significant 
role of the social systems' adaptive capacity developed 
under chronic stressors (i.e., supply-demand gap) in 
enhancing the resilience of the water system. While 
the water system was very sensitive to hazards, its 
adaptive capacity reduced the negative impacts caused 
by service disruptions. In addition, the findings iden-
tify the extent of human-infrastructure coupling as an 
important component influencing the resilience of in-
frastructure systems. In the case of Kathmandu Valley, 
the coupling was not strong due to supply-demand dis-
parity. Hence, the system disruptions did not have as 
extensive impacts. Finally, the findings of this study 
highlight the type of dependencies between the water 
system and other infrastructure. For example, the 
KUKL’s use of water trucks for water supply had cre-
ated an emergent dependency between water and road 
infrastructure. These findings highlights new dimen-
sions of analysis in the emerging field of infrastructure 
resilience and also provide information for decision-
makers in order to better understand the various fac-
tors influencing the resilience of infrastructure sys-
tems in the context of developing countries. 
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